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 Austrian Capital Theory and the Link Between  
Entrepreneurship and the Theory of the Firm 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Several writers link entrepreneurship to asset ownership, trying to incorporate 
the theory of entrepreneurship into the theory of the firm. The critical link, we 
argue, is capital heterogeneity. Transaction cost, property rights, and resource-
based approaches to the firm assume that assets, both tangible and intangible, 
are heterogeneous; arranging these assets to minimize contractual hazards, to 
provide efficient investment incentives, or to exploit competitive advantage is 
conceived as the prime task of economic organization. None of these ap-
proaches, however, is based on a systematic theory of capital heterogeneity. In 
this paper we outline the approach to capital developed by the Austrian school 
of economics and integrate it into an entrepreneurial theory of the firm. We re-
fine Austrian capital theory by defining capital heterogeneity in terms of subjec-
tively perceived attributes, that is, the functions, characteristics, and uses of 
capital assets. Such attributes are not given, but have to be discovered by means 
of entrepreneurial action. Thinking of entrepreneurship as the organization of 
heterogeneous capital provides new insights into the emergence, boundaries, 
and internal organization of the firm, and it suggests testable implications about 
how and where entrepreneurship is manifested. 
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Introduction 
The theory of entrepreneurship comes in many guises. Management scholars and 
economists have made the entrepreneur an innovator, a leader, a creator, a discoverer, 
an equilibrator, and more. In only a few of these theories, however, is entrepreneurship 
linked to asset ownership (examples include Knight, 1921; Mises, 1949; Casson, 1982; 
Foss, 1993; Langlois and Cosgel, 1993; and Foss and Klein, 2005). Ownership theories of 
entrepreneurship start with the proposition entrepreneurial judgment is costly to trade, 
and when judgment is complementary to other assets, it makes sense for entrepreneurs 
to own the relevant complementary assets. A central part of this story is capital or asset 
heterogeneity. The idiosyncrasy of the entrepreneur’s judgment (itself an asset) about 
the use of capital goods is what makes judgment costly to trade. Still, these approaches 
are not founded on any systematic theory of capital or asset attributes. This paper out-
lines the capital theory associated with the Austrian school of economics and derives 
implications for entrepreneurship and economic organization.  
The Austrian school of economics (Menger, 1871; Mises, 1949; Rothbard, 1962; Hayek, 
1968; Kirzner, 1973; Lachmann, 1986) is well known in management studies for its con-
tributions to the theory of entrepreneurship and the complementary “market process” 
account of economic activity (Jacobson 1992; Chiles and Choi, 2000; Langlois, 2001; 
Chiles, 2003; Roberts and Eisenhardt, 2003). Other characteristically Austrian ideas such 
as the time structure of capital and the “malinvestment” theory of the business-cycle 
theory have received much less attention, however. To several Austrians, though, the 
theory of entrepreneurship was closely related to the theory of capital. As Lachmann 
(1956: 13, 16) argued: “We are living in a world of unexpected change; hence capital 
combinations … will be ever changing, will be dissolved and reformed. In this activity, 
we find the real function of the entrepreneur.” It is this “real function” that we elaborate 
in the following.  
 3
Of course, management scholars will hardly find the claim that entrepreneurs organize 
heterogeneous capital goods startling. The management literature abounds with notions 
of heterogeneous “resources,” “competencies,” “capabilities,” “assets,” and the like. 
Linking such work to entrepreneurship would seem to be a rather natural undertaking 
(see, e.g., Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001). However, modern theories of economic organiza-
tion are not built on a unified theory of capital heterogeneity; they simply invoke ad hoc 
specificities when necessary. The Austrian school offers a systematic, comprehensive 
theory of capital, and Austrian notions of capital heterogeneity can inform, synthesize, 
and improve the treatment of specificities in the theory of the firm.  Even more impor-
tantly, adopting such a view of capital brings new insights; thus, we shall argue that 
new sources of transaction costs that matter to economic organization are revealed by 
adopting an Austrian approach to capital.  
The design of the paper is the following. We begin by linking the theory of entrepre-
neurship and the theory of the firm, building on Foss and Klein (2005). The link lies in 
first, defining entrepreneurship as the exercise of judgment over resource uses under 
uncertainty, and second, in viewing the theory of economic organization as a subset of 
the theory of asset ownership (“Entrepreneurship, Judgment, and Asset Ownership”). We 
then discuss “assets” in the specific context of capital theory, showing that the assump-
tion of heterogeneous capital is necessary to the theory of the firm (“Capital Theory and 
the Theory of the Firm”). We next summarize the Austrian theory of capital, elaborating 
and expanding on those parts of the theory most relevant for economic organization 
(“An Austrian Approach to Capital Heterogeneity”). The final section weaves these elements 
together to provide new insights into key questions of the emergence, boundaries, and 
internal organization of the firm (“Organizing Heterogeneous Capital”). A brief conclusion, 
including some suggestions as to which kind of testable implications that may be drawn 
from our theory , ends the paper. 
 
 4
Entrepreneurship, Judgment, and Asset Ownership 
Entrepreneurship and the Theory of the Firm 
Entrepreneurs are the founders and developers of business firms. Indeed, the establish-
ment of a new business venture is the quintessential manifestation of entrepreneurship. 
And yet, as Foss and Klein (2005) point out, the theory of entrepreneurship and the the-
ory of the firm developed largely in isolation. The economic theory of the firm emerged 
and took shape as the entrepreneur was being banished from microeconomic analysis, 
first in the 1930s when the firm was subsumed into neoclassical price theory (O’Brien, 
1984), and then in the 1980s as the theory of the firm was reformulated in the language 
of game theory and the economics of information. In modern contributions to the theory 
of the firm (Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1996; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Hart, 1995) refer-
ence to entrepreneurship is passing at best.  
Foss and Klein (2005) show how the theory of entrepreneurship and the theory of the 
firm can be linked by starting with the concept of entrepreneurship as judgment (for re-
lated earlier exercises along the same line, see Casson 1982, Langlois and Cosgel 1993). 
In this view, which traces its origins to the first systematic treatment of entrepreneur-
ship in economics, Richard Cantillon’s Essai sur la nature de commerce en géneral (1755), 
entrepreneurship consists of judgmental decision-making under conditions of uncer-
tainty. Judgment refers primarily to business decision-making when the range of possible 
future outcomes, let alone the likelihood of individual outcomes, is generally unknown 
(what Knight [1921] terms uncertainty, rather than mere probabilistic risk) (cf. also Lan-
glois and Cosgel 1993).  
As such, judgment is distinct from imagination or creativity (Begley and Boyd, 1987; 
Chandler and Jansen, 1992; Aldrich and Wiedenmayer, 1993; Hood and Young, 1993; 
Lumpkin and Dess, 1996, innovation (Schumpeter 1911), alertness (Kirzner 1973), lead-
ership (Witt1998a, 1998b), and other concepts of entrepreneurship that appear in the 
economics and management literatures. Judgment must be exercised in mundane cir-
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cumstances, for ongoing operations as well as new ventures, as Knight (1921) empha-
sized. While alertness tends to be passive (perhaps even hard to distinguish from luck 
[Demsetz, 1983]), judgment is active. Entrepreneurs are those who seek to profit by ac-
tively promoting adjustment to change. Those who specialize in judgmental decision-
making may be dynamic, charismatic leaders, but they need not possess these traits. De-
cision making under uncertainty is entrepreneurial, whether it involves imagination, 
creativity, leadership, and related factors or not. 
Knight (1921) introduces the notion of judgment to link profit and the firm to the existence 
of uncertainty. Judgment primarily refers to the process of businessmen forming estimates 
of future events in situations in which there is no agreement or idea at all on probabilities 
of occurrence. Entrepreneurship represents judgment that cannot be assessed in terms of 
its marginal product and which cannot, accordingly, be paid a wage (Knight 1921: 311). 
This is because entrepreneurship is judgment about the most uncertain events, such as 
starting a new firm, defining a new market, and the like. In other words, there is no mar-
ket for the judgment that entrepreneurs rely on, so exercising judgment requires the 
person with judgment to start a firm. Judgment thus implies asset ownership, for judg-
mental decision-making is ultimately decision-making about the employment of resources. 
An entrepreneur without capital goods is, in Knight’s sense, no entrepreneur.  
This implies an obvious link with the theory of the firm, particularly those (transaction 
cost and property rights theories) that define asset ownership as a crucial ingredient of 
firm organization (Williamson, 1996; Hart, 1995) (cf. also Langlois and Cosgel, 1993). 
The firm, in this sense, is the entrepreneur and the alienable assets he owns, and there-
fore ultimately controls. The theory of the firm is essentially a theory of how the entre-
preneur exercises his judgmental decision-making with respect to allocating heteroge-
neous capital assets— what combinations of assets will he seek to acquire, what (proxi-
mate) decisions will he delegate to subordinates, how will he provide incentives and 
employ monitoring to see that his assets are used consistently with his judgments, and 
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so on. Given this, one may perhaps expect the modern theory of the firm to be based on 
a coherent, systematic theory of capital. This is, however, not the case.  
 
Capital Theory and the Theory of the Firm 
Shmoo Capital and Its Implications 
Modern (neoclassical) economics focuses on a highly stylized model of the production 
process. The firm is a production function, a “black box” that transforms inputs (land, 
labor, capital) into output (consumer goods). As is widely recognized in modern treat-
ments of the firm, this model omits the critical organizational details of production, 
rarely looking inside the black box to see how hierarchies are structured, how incentives 
are provided, how teams are organized, and so on. An equally serious omission, per-
haps, is that production is treated as a one-stage process, with only factors and final 
goods, rather than a complex, multi-stage process unfolding through time and employ-
ing rounds of intermediate goods. Hence “capital” can be treated as a homogeneous 
factor of production, the “K” that appears in the production function along with “L” for 
labor. Following Solow (1957) models of economic growth typically model capital as 
what Paul Samuelson called “shmoo” – an infinitely elastic, fully moldable factor that 
can be substituted costlessly from one production process to another. 
In a world of shmoo capital economic organization is relatively unimportant. All capital 
assets possess the same attributes, and thus the costs of inspecting, measuring, and 
monitoring the attributes of productive assets is trivial. Exchange markets for assets 
would be virtually devoid of transaction costs. A few basic contractual problems ⎯ in 
particular, principal-agent conflicts over the supply of labor services ⎯ may remain, 
though workers would all use identical capital assets, and this would greatly contribute 
to reducing the costs of measuring their productivity. Thus, transaction costs would not 
disappear entirely.  
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However, it is hard to see what role ownership of capital assets would play in this 
world. If the costs of measuring and specifying attributes are low, entrepreneurs and 
factor owners could contract over attributes, and there would be little incentive to ac-
quire ownership of assets themselves. Transactions involving such assets would be gov-
erned by complete, contingent contracts.1 Because contracts would substitute for owner-
ship in a shmoo world, the boundaries of firms would be indeterminate (Hart 1995).  
Modern Theories of the Firm  
By contrast, all modern theories of the firm assume (often implicitly) that capital assets 
possess varying attributes, so that all assets are not equally valuable in all uses. Thus, 
they make an implicit break with the assumption of shmoo capital. In the following, we 
briefly show how capital heterogeneity contributes to producing non-trivial contracting 
problems, the solution of which may require firm organization.  
Asset specificity approaches. In transaction cost economics (TCE) (Williamson, 1975, 
1985, 1996) and the property-rights approach associated with Grossman and Hart (1986) 
and Hart and Moore (1990), some assets are conceived as specific to particular users. If it 
is impossible to write complete, contingent contracts specifying the most valuable uses 
of such assets in all possible states of the world, owners of productive assets face certain 
risks. The need to adapt to unforeseen contingencies constitutes an important cost of 
contracting. Failure to adapt imposes what Williamson (1991) calls “maladaptation 
costs,” the best known of which is the “holdup” problem associated with relationship-
specific investments.  
TCE holds that farsighted parties will tend to craft governance structures that mitigate 
potential hazards. In this way, the theory of the firm may be considered the study of 
alternative institutions of governance. Its working hypothesis, as expressed by William-
son (1991b: 79), is that economic organization is mainly an effort to “align transactions, 
                                                 
1 Admittedly, the costs of drafting contracts could still leave many contracts incomplete, but this would 
not provide room for ownership either, as possessing completely homogenous capital would not confer 
any bargaining power in a trading relationship.  
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which differ in their attributes, with governance structures, which differ in their costs 
and competencies, in a discriminating (mainly, transaction cost economizing) way.”  
It is obvious that mal-adaptation costs largely disappear if all assets are equally valuable 
in all uses. Potential hold-up problems would still be a concern for owners of relation-
ship-specific human capital and raw materials, but disagreements over the efficient use 
of capital goods would become irrelevant. The scope of entrepreneurial activity would 
also be severely reduced, since entrepreneurs would have no need to try out the rele-
vant attributes of capital assets.  
Resource- and knowledge-based approaches. Resource-based approaches (Wernerfelt, 
1984; Barney, 1991; Lippman and Rumelt, 2003) and knowledge-based approaches (Pen-
rose, 1959; Grant, 1996) approaches also emphasize capital heterogeneity, but in a 
slightly different sense. The emphasis in these approaches is not economic organization, 
but competitive advantage. The latter is seen as emerging from bundles of resources 
(including knowledge). Different resource bundles are associated with different efficien-
cies, translating into a theory of competitive advantage. Resource- and knowledge-based 
scholars often emphasize that heterogeneous assets do not give rise independently to 
competitive advantages. Rather, it is the interactions among these resources, their rela-
tions of specificity and co-specialization, that generate such advantages (e.g., Dierickx 
and Cool, 1989; Barney, 1991; Black and Boal, 1994). However, this notion is not devel-
oped from any comprehensive perspective on asset specificity and co-specialization (or 
complementarity).  
“Old” property rights theory. A sophisticated approach to capital heterogeneity can be 
drawn from the property-rights approach associated with economists such as Alchian 
(1965), Demsetz (1964, 1967), and, particularly, Barzel (1997). To these writers, it is in fact 
not individual assets that are of primary interests, but rather how productive assets can 
be understood as bundles of attributes to which property rights may be held.  
While it is common to view capital heterogeneity in terms of physical heterogeneity — 
beer barrels and blast furnaces are different because of their physical differences — the 
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economic approach emphasizes that capital goods are heterogeneous because they have 
different levels and kinds of valued attributes (in the terminology of Barzel, 1997).2 At-
tributes are characteristics, functions, possible uses of assets, etc., as perceived by an en-
trepreneur. For example, a copying machine has multiple attributes because it can be 
used at different time, by different people, for different types of copying work; that it 
can be purchased in different colors and sizes; and so on. Rights to such attributes can 
be defined and traded, depending on transaction costs (Foss and Foss, 2001).  
Clearly, virtually all assets have multiple attributes. Assets are heterogeneous to the ex-
tent that they have different, and different levels of, valued attributes. Attributes may 
also vary over time, even for a particular asset. In a world of “true” uncertainty, entre-
preneurs are unlikely to know all relevant attributes of all assets when production deci-
sions are made. Nor can the future attributes of an asset, as it is used in production, be 
forecast with certainty. Future attributes must be discovered, over time, as assets are used 
in production. Or, to formulate the problem slightly differently, future attributes are 
created as entrepreneurs envision new ways of using assets to produce goods.  
Summing up. While capital heterogeneity thus plays an important role in transaction 
cost, resource-based, and property-rights approaches to the firm, none of these ap-
proaches rests on a unified, systematic theory of capital goods. Instead, each invokes the 
needed specificities in an ad hoc fashion to rationalize particular trading problems. For 
example, asset specificity underlies the hold-up problem. Some writers (Demsetz, 1991; 
Winter, 1991; Langlois and Foss, 1999) argue that the economics of organization has 
shown a tendency (albeit an imperfect tendency) to respect an implict dichotomy be-
tween the production aspects and the exchange aspects of the firm. Thus, as Langlois 
and Foss (1999) argue there is an implicit agreement that the production function ap-
proach with its attendant assumptions (e.g., blueprint knowledge) tell us what we need 
to know about production. The analytical enterprise concerns addressing the hazards 
                                                 
2 Foss and Foss (2005) links the property rights approach to the resource-based view, demonstrating how 
the more “micro” approach of the property rights approach provides additional insights into resource-
vale.  
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that transacting is fraught with and how these hazards can be mitigated by organiza-
tion. Therefore, production issues, including capital theory, never really take center-
stage, but are introduced in a ad hoc manner. However, this is a problematic approach to 
the extent that taking fuller of production issues reveals new problems of transacting 
that may influence economic organization. That a focus on Austrian capital theory has 
such implications will be argued next.  
 
Capital Heterogeneity and Asset Attributes  
An alternative tradition in economics, the Austrian school, does have a systematic, com-
prehensive theory of capital, though it has not generally been applied to the business 
firm.3 
Austrian Capital Theory 
The concept of heterogeneous capital has a long and distinguished place in Austrian 
economics.4 Early Austrian writers argued that capital has a time dimension as well as a 
value dimension. Carl Menger (1871), the founder of the Austrian school, characterized 
goods in terms of “orders”: Goods of lowest order are those consumed directly, tools 
and machines used to produce those consumption goods are of a higher order, and 
those capital goods used to produce the tools and machines are of an even higher order. 
Building on his theory that the value of all goods is determined by their ability to satisfy 
consumer wants, Menger showed that the value of the higher-order goods is given (“im-
puted”) by the value of the lower-order goods they produce. Moreover, because certain 
capital goods are themselves produced by other, higher-order capital goods, it follows 
that capital goods are not identical, at least by the time they are employed in the produc-
tion process. This is not to say that there is no substitution among capital goods, but that 
                                                 
3 Of the several dozen papers on Austrian economics and the theory of the firm (including, for instance, 
the papers collected in Foss and Klein, 2002), only a few are based on Austrian capital theory. (See Yu, 
1999, and various papers by the present authors.) 
4 See Lewin (2000) for an overview. 
 11
the degree of substitution is limited; as Lachmann (1956) put it, capital goods are charac-
terized by “multiple specificity.” Some substitution is possible, but only at a cost (see 
also Hayek 1941).5 
Kirzner (1966) provided an important refinement to the Austrian theory of capital by 
emphasizing the role of the entrepreneur (the theme that dominates Kirzner’s later, bet-
ter known, work). Earlier Austrian writers, particularly Böhm-Bawerk, tried to charac-
terize the economy’s capital structure in terms of its physical attributes. Böhm-Bawerk 
attempted to describe the temporal “length” of the structure of production by a single 
number, the “average period of production.” Kirzner’s approach avoids these difficul-
ties by defining capital assets in terms of subjective, individual production plans, plans 
that are formulated and continually revised by profit-seeking entrepreneurs. Capital 
goods should thus be characterized, not by their physical properties, but by their place 
in the structure of production as conceived by entrepreneurs. The actual place of any capi-
tal good in the time sequence of production is given by the market for capital goods, in 
which entrepreneurs bid for factors of production in anticipation of future consumer 
demands. This subjectivist, entrepreneurial approach to capital assets is particularly 
congenial to theories of the firm that focus on entrepreneurship and the ownership of 
assets.  
                                                 
5 Hayek’s Prices and Production (1931) emphasized the relationship between the value of capital goods and 
their place in the temporal sequence of production. Because production takes time, factors of production 
must be committed in the present for making final goods that will have value only in the future after they 
are sold. However, capital is heterogeneous. As capital goods are used in production, they are trans-
formed from general-purpose materials and components to intermediate products specific to particular 
final goods. Consequently, these assets cannot be easily redeployed to alternative uses if demands for 
final goods change. The central macroeconomic problem in a modern capital-using economy is thus one 
of intertemporal coordination: how can the allocation of resources between capital and consumer goods be 
aligned with consumers’ preferences between present and future consumption? In The Pure Theory of Capi-
tal (1941) Hayek describes how the economy’s structure of production depends on the characteristics of 
capital goods—durability, complementarity, substitutability, specificity, and so on. 
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Understanding Capital Heterogeneity 
The Austrian approach to capital generated considerable controversy, both within the 
school itself and between the Austrians and rival schools of economic thought. Given 
that much attention was devoted to the problems of measuring a heterogeneous capital 
stock, it is surprising that relatively little analytical effort has been devoted to the con-
cept of heterogeneity itself. The notion of heterogeneous capital is crucial not just for 
Austrian capital theory, but for (Austrian) economics in general. For example, the Aus-
trian position in the socialist calculation debate of the 1930s (Mises, 1920; Hayek, 1933) is 
based on an entrepreneurial concept of the market process, one in which the entrepre-
neur’s primary function is to choose among the various combinations of factors suitable 
for producing particular goods (and to decide whether these goods should be produced 
at all), based on current prices for the factors and expected future prices of the final 
goods. If capital is shmoo with one price, then entrepreneurship is reduced to choosing 
between shmoo-intensive and labor-intensive production methods (or among types of 
labor). Lachmann (1956: 16), by contrast, stressed that real-world entrepreneurship con-
sists primarily of choosing among combinations of capital assets:  
[T]he entrepreneur’s function … is to specify and make decisions on the concrete 
form the capital resources shall have. He specifies and modifies the layout of his 
plant ... As long as we disregard the heterogeneity of capital, the true function of 
the entrepreneur must also remain hidden.  
Kirzner’s argument that capital goods are heterogeneous not because of their objective 
characteristics, but because they play particular roles within the entrepreneur’s overall 
production plan, further developed the link between entrepreneurship and capital het-
erogeneity. In our interpretation, capital goods are distinguished by their attributes, in 
the terminology of Barzel (1997) (Foss and Foss, 2001).  
Attributes are characteristics and possible uses of assets, as perceived by an entrepre-
neur. For example, a copying machine has multiple attributes in the sense that it can be 
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used at different time, by different people, for different types of copying work, that it 
can be purchased in different colors, sizes, and so on. Clearly, virtually all assets have 
multiple attributes. Specificity and complementarity ⎯ key notions in both Austrian 
capital theory and modern theories of economic organization (Williamson 1985, 1996; 
Hart 1995) ⎯ are more abstract examples of attributes. 
 In our terminology, capital assets are heterogeneous to the extent that they have differ-
ent, and different levels of, valued attributes. Attributes may also vary over time, even 
for a particular asset. In a world of “true” uncertainty, entrepreneurs are unlikely to 
know all relevant attributes of all assets when production decisions are made. Nor can 
the future attributes of an asset, as it is used in production, be forecast with certainty.6 
Future attributes must be discovered over time, as assets are used in production. Or, to 
formulate the problem slightly differently, future attributes are created as entrepreneurs 
envision new ways of using assets to produce consumer goods. As Alchian and Dem-
setz (1972: 793) note, “[e]fficient production with heterogeneous resources is a result not 
of having better resources but in knowing more accurately the relative productive perform-
ances of those resources.” Contra the production function view in basic neoclassical eco-
nomics, such knowledge is not given, but has to be discovered and/or created.  
Heterogeneous Assets, Property Rights, and Ownership 
Focusing on attributes not only helps better conceptualizing heterogeneous capital, but 
also illuminates the vast literature on property rights and ownership. Barzel (1997) 
stresses that property rights are held over attributes, and property rights to known at-
tributes of assets are the relevant units of analysis in his work. In contrast, he dismisses 
the notion of asset ownership as essentially legal and extra-economic. Similarly, Dem-
setz argues that the notion of “full private ownership” over assets is “vague,” and “must 
always remain so,” because “there is an infinity of potential rights of actions that can be 
                                                 
6 This sense of uncertainty links naturally with the notion of contractual incompleteness. We explore the 
implications of this idea below.  
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owned … It is impossible to describe the complete set of rights that are potentially ow-
nable” (Demsetz, 1988: 19).  
However, as we noted above, most assets have unspecified, not-yet-discovered attrib-
utes, and an important function of entrepreneurship is to create or discover these attrib-
utes. Contrary to Demsetz, it is exactly this feature that creates a distinct role for asset 
ownership -- that is, for acquiring legal title to a bundle of existing attributes as well as 
to future attributes. Specifically, ownership is a low-cost means of allocating the rights 
to attributes of assets that are created or discovered by the entrepreneur-owner. For in-
stance, those who create or discover new knowledge have an incentive to use it directly 
because it is costly to transfer knowledge to others. In a well-functioning legal system, 
ownership of an asset normally implies that the courts will not interfere when an entre-
preneur-owner captures the value of newly created or discovered attributes of an asset 
he owns. Consequently, the entrepreneur-owner can usually avoid costly negotiation 
with those who are affected his creation or discovery. This keeps the dissipation of value 
at bay. Of course, asset ownership itself provides a powerful incentive to create or dis-
cover new attributes, as ownership conveys the legally recognized (and at least partly 
enforced) right to the income of an asset, including the right to income from new attrib-
utes. 
Heterogeneous Capital and Experimental Entrepreneurship 
The Austrian idea of heterogeneous capital is thus a natural complement to the theory of 
entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurs who seek to create or discover new attributes of capital 
assets will want ownership titles to the relevant assets, both for speculative reasons and 
for reasons of economizing on transaction costs. These arguments provide room for en-
trepreneurship that goes beyond deploying a superior combination of capital assets with 
“given” attributes, acquiring the relevant assets, and deploying these to producing for a 
market: Entrepreneurship may also be a matter of experimenting with capital assets in an 
attempt to discover new valued attributes.  
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Such experimental activity may take place in the context of trying out new combinations 
through the acquisition of or merger with another firms, or in the form of trying out new 
combinations of assets already under the control of the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur’s 
success in experimenting with assets in this manner may depends on what Kirzner 
(1973) terms his “alertness,” along with factors such as transaction costs in the market 
for corporate control, internal transaction costs, the entrepreneur’s control over the rele-
vant assets, how much of the expected return from experimental activity that he can 
hope to appropriate, and so on.  
Observe that these latter factors are key determinants of economic organization in mod-
ern theories of the firm. This suggests that there may be fruitful complementarities be-
tween the theory of economic organization, which is essentially a theory about the ar-
rangements of property titles that create an efficient employment of capital assets, and 
Austrian theories of capital heterogeneity and entrepreneurship.  
 
Organizing Heterogeneous Capital 
Here we show how Austrian notions of capital heterogeneity give additional insights 
into the theory of the firm. The key questions here concern why firms emerge and what 
explains their boundaries (scope) and internal organization. In the following, we relate 
these issues to our emphasis on entrepreneurship as judgment concerning the organiza-
tion and use of heterogeneous capital assets. 
The Emergence of the Firm 
Coase (1937) explained the firm as a means for economizing on transaction costs, a 
theme elaborated by Williamson (1975, 1985, 1996). Alchian and Demsetz (1972) viewed 
the firm as an (albeit imperfect) solution to the free-rider problem in team production. 
Resource-based theories emphasize the need to generate and internalize tacit knowl-
edge. It is not obvious where the entrepreneur fits into these approaches, however. Our 
framework suggests a slightly different approach.  
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Incomplete markets for judgment. Agents may realize rents from their human capital 
through three means: (1) selling labor services on market conditions, (2) entering into em-
ployment contracts, or (3) starting a firm. As Barzel (1987) argues, moral hazard implies 
that options (1) and (2) are often inefficient means of realizing rents. In other words, entre-
preneurs know themselves to be good risks but are unable to communicate this to the 
market. For this reason, firms may emerge because the person whose services are the most 
difficult to measure (and therefore are most susceptible to moral hazard and adverse selec-
tion) becomes an entrepreneur, employing and supervising other agents, and committing 
capital of his own to the venture, thus contributing a bond.  
However, there are other reasons why the market may not be able to evaluate entrepre-
neurial services. For example, Kirzner (1979: 181) argues that “entrepreneurship reveals to 
the market what the market did not realize was available, or indeed, needed at all.” Casson 
(1982: 14) takes a more Schumpeterian position, arguing that “[t]he entrepreneur believes 
he is right, while everyone else is wrong. Thus the essence of entrepreneurship is being 
different — being different because one has a different perception of the situation” (see 
also Casson, 1997). In this situation, non-contractibility arises because “[t]he decisive fac-
tors . . . are so largely on the inside of the person making the decision that the ‘instances’ 
are not amenable to objective description and external control” (Knight, 1921: 251). Hence 
moral hazard is not the only important factor underlying non-contractibility. An agent 
may be unable to communicate his “vision” of a commercial experiment — a specific way 
of combining heterogeneous capital assets to serve future consumer wants — in such a 
way that other agents can assess its economic implications. In such a case, he cannot be an 
employee, but will instead start his own firm. The existence of the firm can thus be ex-
plained by a specific category of transaction costs, namely, those that close the market for 
entrepreneurial judgment.  
Firms as controlled experiments. The idea of incomplete markets for judgment helps us 
understand the one-person firm. However, similar ideas may also be useful for under-
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standing the multi-person firm; that is, it may help us understand the emergence of the 
employment contract.  
Consider again the notion of capital (resource) heterogeneity. If capital is homogenous, 
conceiving, coordinating and implementing plans with respect to producing, marketing 
and selling goods and services are relatively straightforward. The decision problem is 
one of choosing the intensities with which shmoo is applied to various activities. In the 
real world of heterogeneous capital assets, by contrast, production plans are much more 
difficult to conceive, coordinate, and implement. It is not necessarily obvious to which 
activities capital goods are most profitably applied and account has to be taken of com-
plex relations between capital goods.  
Even if the restrictive assumption of shmoo capital is dropped, economics nevertheless 
often sidestep these problems. Thus, although the “production function view” of the 
firm can formally incorporate heterogeneous capital, the problem of coordinating, etc. 
their uses is sidestepped by assuming that the assets controlled by the firm are already 
in their best uses. More realistically, however, full ex ante knowledge about how produc-
tive activities are broken down in tasks, how tasks are related to physical capital inputs, 
how the tasks are optimally sequenced, etc. is not likely to exist.   
Given that the optimal relationships among assets are generally unknown ex ante, and 
often so complex that resort to analytical methods is not possible (Galloway, 1996), some 
experimentation is necessary. First, one must isolate the system boundaries, that is, 
where the relevant relationships among assets are most likely to be. Second, the experi-
mental process must be like a controlled experiment (or a sequence of such experiments) 
to isolate the system from outside disturbances. Third, there must be some sort of guid-
ance for the experiment. This may take many forms, ranging from centrally provided 
instructions to negotiated agreements to shared understandings of where to begin ex-
perimenting, how to avoid overlapping experiments, how to revise the experiment in 
light of past results, and so on. The central problem is how this experimental process is 
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best organized. Does the need for experimentation help explain the existence of the firm, 
or can such experimentation be organized efficiently through markets?  
In a world of complete knowledge and zero transaction costs, all rights to all uses of all 
assets could be specified in contracts. By contrast, in a world of heterogeneous assets 
with attributes that are costly to measure and partly unforeseen, complete contracts 
cannot be drafted. The resulting set of incomplete contracts may constitute a firm, a 
process of coordination managed by the entrepreneur’s central direction. If relationship-
specific assets are involved, the holdup problem described above becomes a serious 
concern.  
Thus, asset specificity may itself be an outcome of an experimental process. To be sure, 
Williamson (e.g., 1985, 1996) clearly allows for intertemporal considerations relating to 
what he calls the “fundamental transformation” (i.e., the transformation of large num-
bers to small numbers situation, and therefore the emergence of asset specificity). How-
ever, he doesn’t describe this process in much detail. In the present approach, as ex-
perimental activity provides information about how to optimize the system, assets will 
be increasingly specific in terms of time and location. Temporal and site specificity will 
tend to increase as assets become more efficiently coordinated. This provides one ra-
tionale for organizing the experiments inside firms, though not the only one. Firms may 
also be justified by problems associated with the dispersion of knowledge across agents. 
Production systems may exhibit multiple equilibria, and it may not be obvious how to 
coordinate on a particular equilibrium or even which equilibria are preferred.  
In principle, an experimenting team could hire an outside consultant who guides the 
experimental activity, giving advice on the sequence of actions and asset uses, initiating 
the experiments, drawing the appropriate conclusions from each experiment, determin-
ing how these conclusions should influence further experimentation, and so on. How-
ever, such an arrangement is likely to run into serious bargaining costs. Under market 
contracting any team member can veto the advice provided by the consultant, and sub-
mitting to authority may be the least costly way to organize the experimental activity. 
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“Authority” here means that the entrepreneur has the right to redefine and reallocate 
decision rights among team members and to sanction team members who do not use 
their decision rights efficiently. By possessing these rights, entrepreneur-managers can 
conduct experiments without continuously having to renegotiate contracts, saving bar-
gaining and drafting costs. Such an arrangement then provides a setting for carrying out 
“controlled” experiments in which the entrepreneur-manager changes only some as-
pects of the relevant tasks to trace the effects of specific rearrangements of rights. Estab-
lishing these property rights is tantamount to forming a firm.  
The Boundaries of the Firm 
In the approach developed in this paper, the theory of firm boundaries is closely related 
to the theory of entrepreneurship. Mergers, acquisitions, divestitures, and other reor-
ganizations can generate efficiencies by replacing poorly performing managers, creating 
operating synergies, or establishing internal capital markets. Like other business prac-
tices that do not conform to textbook models of competition, mergers, acquisitions, and 
financial restructurings have long been viewed with suspicion by some commentators 
and regulatory authorities. However, the academic literature clearly suggests that cor-
porate restructurings do, on average, create value (Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter, 1988; 
Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001). Given such benefits, why are many mergers later 
“reversed” in a divestiture, spin-off, or carve-out? Klein and Klein (2001) distinguish 
between two basic views. The first, which may be termed empire building, holds that en-
trenched managers make acquisitions primarily to increase their own power, prestige or 
control, producing negligible efficiency gains, and that acquisitions by manager-
controlled firms are likely to be divested ex post. Most important, because the acquiring 
firm’s motives are suspect, such acquisitions are ex ante inefficient; neutral observers 
can predict, based on pre-merger characteristics, that these mergers are unlikely to be 
viable over time. (Moreover, by permitting these acquisitions, capital-market partici-
pants are also guilty of systematic error.)  
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A second view, which Klein and Klein (2001) term entrepreneurial market process, ac-
knowledges that unprofitable acquisitions may be “mistakes” ex post, but argues that 
poor long-term performance does not indicate ex ante inefficiency. In the market-
process perspective, a divestiture of previously acquired assets may mean simply that 
profit-seeking entrepreneurs have updated their forecasts of future conditions or other-
wise learned from experience. They are adjusting structure of heterogeneous capital as-
sets specific to their firms. As Mises (1949: 252) puts it, “the outcome of action is always 
uncertain. Action is always speculation.” Consequently, “the real entrepreneur is a 
speculator, a man eager to utilize his opinion about the future structure of the market 
for business operations promising profits. This specific anticipative understanding of 
the conditions of the uncertain future defies any rules and systematization” (p. 585, em-
phasis added).  
Klein and Klein (2001) discuss empirical evidence that the long-term success or failure of 
corporate acquisitions cannot, in general, be predicted by measures of manager control 
or principal-agent problems. However, significantly higher rates of divestiture tend to 
follow mergers that occur in a cluster of mergers in the same industry. As argued by 
Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001), and Andrade and 
Stafford (2004), mergers frequently occur in industry clusters, suggesting that mergers 
are driven in part by industry-specific factors, such as regulatory shocks. When an in-
dustry is regulated, deregulated, or re-regulated, economic calculation becomes more 
difficult, and entrepreneurial activity is hampered. It should not be surprising that poor 
long-term performance is more likely under those conditions. 
This notion of entrepreneurial decision-making under uncertainty squares with recent 
theories of acquisitions as a form of experimentation (Mosakowski, 1997; Boot, Mil-
bourn, and Thakor, 1999; Matsusaka, 2001). In these models, profit-seeking entrepre-
neurs can learn their own capabilities only by trying various combinations of activities, 
which could include diversifying into new industries. Firms may thus make diversifying 
acquisitions even if they know these acquisitions are likely to be reversed in a divesti-
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ture. This process generates information that is useful for revising entrepreneurial plans, 
and thus an acquisition strategy may be successful even if individual acquisitions are 
not. In these cases, the long-term viability of an acquisition may be systematically re-
lated to publicly observable, pre-merger characteristics associated with experimentation, 
but not characteristics associated with managerial discretion. 
Internal Organization  
As Foss and Klein (2005) point out, most existing approaches to entrepreneurship, even 
if linked to the existence of firms, say little about the key questions of internal organiza-
tion: How should decision rights be assigned? How should employees be motivated and 
evaluated? How should firms be divided into divisions and departments? The notion of 
judgment-based entrepreneurship offers insight into these questions. 
Productive and destructive entrepreneurship. Consider first the way firm structure af-
fects the exercise of entrepreneurial judgment – or a proxy version of such judgment – 
within the organization. In much of the entrepreneurship literature, there is a general, 
though usually implicit claim that all entrepreneurial activity is socially beneficial 
(Mises, 1949; Kirzner, 1973). However, as Baumol (1990) and Holcombe (2002) point out, 
entrepreneurship may be socially harmful if it takes the form of rent-seeking, attempting 
to influence governments (or management) to redistribute income but in the process 
consuming resources and bringing about a social loss. It is therefore necessary to intro-
duce a distinction between productive and destructive entrepreneurship.  
When agents expend effort discovering new attributes and taking control over these in 
such a way that joint surplus (net social benefit) is reduced, we shall speak of “destruc-
tive entrepreneurship.” Thus, discovering new forms of moral hazard (Holmström, 
1982), creating hold-ups (Williamson, 1996), and inventing new ways of engaging in 
rent-seeking activities relative to government (Baumol, 1990, Holcombe, 2002) are ex-
amples of destructive entrepreneurship in the sense that these represent the discovery of 
new attributes that decrease joint surplus. “Productive entrepreneurship” refers to the 
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creation or discovery of new attributes leading to an increase in joint surplus. For exam-
ple, a franchisee may discover new local tastes that in turn may form the basis for new 
products for the entire chain; an employee may figure out better uses of production as-
sets and communicate this to the TQM team of which he is a member; a CEO may for-
mulate a new business concept; etc. In the following we sketch how this distinction pro-
vides a way of developing an entrepreneurial approach to internal organization. Note 
that we here use the term “entrepreneurship” more broadly than before, referring not 
only to decisions made by resource owners (entrepreneurship in the strict sense), but 
also to decisions made by employees, acting as proxy decision-makers for the resource 
owners. 
Fundamental tradeoffs in internal organization. The first such problem concerns the 
control of destructive entrepreneurial activities. For example, firms may delimit em-
ployees’ use of telephone and internet services by closely specifying their use rights over 
the relevant assets, instructing them to act in a proper manner towards customers and to 
exercise care when operating the firm’s equipment, and the like. However, firms are 
unlikely to succeed entirely in their attempt to curb such activities. One reason for this is 
the costs of monitoring employees. Another reason is that employees may creatively 
circumvent constraints; for example, they may invent ways of covering their (mis-)use 
of the internet. Although firms may know that such destructive entrepreneurship takes 
place, they may prefer not to try to constrain it further. This is because the various con-
straints that firms impose on employees (or, more generally, that contracting partners 
impose on each other) to curb destructive entrepreneurship may have the unwanted 
side effect that productive entrepreneurship is stifled (see Kirzner, 1985).  
More generally, imposing (too many) constraints on employees may reduce their pro-
pensity to create or discover new attributes of productive assets. At any rate, many firms 
increasingly appear to operate on the presumption that beneficial effects may be pro-
duced by reducing constraints on employees in various dimensions. For example, firms 
such as 3M allocate time to research employees that they are basically free to use in al-
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most any way they see fit in the hope that this will produce serendipitous discoveries. 
Many consulting firms do something similar. Of course, industrial firms have long 
known that employees with many decision rights — researchers, for example —must be 
monitored and constrained in different, and typically much looser, ways than those em-
ployees charged only with routine tasks. More broadly, the increasing emphasis on 
“empowerment” during the last few decades reflects a realization that employees derive 
a benefit from controlling aspects of their job situation. Moreover, the total quality 
movement emphasizes that delegating various rights to employees motivates them to 
find new ways to increase the mean and reduce the variance of quality (Jensen and 
Wruck, 1994). To the extent that such activities increase joint surplus, they represent 
productive entrepreneurship. 
Stimulating the productive creation and discovery of new attributes by relaxing con-
straints on employees results in principal-agent relationships that are less completely 
specified. This is not simply a matter of delegation, or transferring specific decision 
rights, but rather giving agents opportunities to exercise their own, often far reaching, 
judgments. However, as we have seen, this also permits potentially destructive entre-
preneurship. Managing the tradeoff between productive and destructive entrepreneur-
ship thus becomes a critical management task.  
Choosing efficient tradeoffs. In this context, asset ownership is important because it 
gives entrepreneurs the right to define contractual constraints, that is, to choose their 
own preferred tradeoffs. Briefly stated, ownership allows the employer-entrepreneur’s 
preferred degree of contractual incompleteness — and therefore a certain combination 
of productive and destructive entrepreneurship — to be implemented at low cost. This 
function of ownership is particularly important in a dynamic market process, the kind 
stressed by Knight (in the later chapters of Knight, 1921) and the Austrians (Hayek, 
1948; Kirzner, 1973; Littlechild, 1986). In such a context, an ongoing process of judg-
mental decision making requires contractual constraints to address the changing trade-
offs between productive and destructive entrepreneurship inside the firm. The power 
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conferred by ownership allows the employer-entrepreneur to do this at low cost (for a 
fuller analysis, see Foss and Foss, 2002).  
Concluding Discussion 
Contribution to Theory 
This paper emphasizes the importance of capital heterogeneity for theories of entrepre-
neurship and the firm. If capital were homogeneous, the entrepreneurial act would be 
trivial. Many, if not most, of the interesting problems of economic organization would 
disappear. This implies that the theory of capital should be an integral part of theories of 
entrepreneurship and economic organization. It also suggests extending the Austrian 
emphasis on entrepreneurship in the context of markets to entrepreneurship in the con-
text of firms.  
However, the concept of capital heterogeneity does more than simply establishing the 
necessary conditions for entrepreneurship and the typical problems of economic organi-
zation. Taking fuller account of heterogeneous capital, as developed by the Austrians, 
reveals exchange problems (i.e., transaction costs) that are relevant to economic organi-
zation but neglected in mainstream theories of the firm.7 In a setting with heterogeneous 
capital and uncertainty, the process of entrepreneurial experimentation has distinct im-
plications for economic organization.  As we have argued, the process of experimenting 
with heterogeneous capital may be best organized within a firm, helping to explain why 
firms emerge.  Similarly, experiments with heterogeneous capital assets may underlie 
much of the observed dynamics of the boundaries of firms.  Thus, it is not a priori known 
whether capital assets controlled by potential takeover target will be a good fit with the 
firm’s assets; this has to be tried out in an experimental fashion.  Finally, we have ar-
gued that internal organization is also illuminated by a focus on judgment, heterogene-
ous capital, and experimentation.  
                                                 
7  In contrast, our emphasis on understanding economic organization in a dynamic context has obvious parallels to 
Langlois’ (1992) notion of ”dynamic transaction costs.”  
 25
Future Work 
To be sure, our analysis so far is preliminary and incomplete. We have concentrated on 
exploring the links between Austrian economics and modern approaches to economic 
organization. Because we offer here an exploratory, suggestive treatment, we have pro-
vided less detail on specific causal mechanisms and have not put any explicit, testable 
propositions on the table.  
However, our approach is potentially rich in predictive power. For example, because 
entrepreneurial judgment requires resource ownership, the theory of employment ⎯ 
the contractual relations between the entrepreneurs and those they hire to help them 
execute their plans ⎯ is ultimately a theory of delegation. Judgment, as the ultimate deci-
sion-making factor of production (in Grossman and Hart’s terminology, the residual 
rights of control) cannot be delegated, by definition. But many other proximate decision 
rights can, and of course are, delegated to employees. Operationalizing this insight, and 
deriving testable implications from it, can be done by identifying the circumstances un-
der which particular decision rights (what we may call derived judgment) can be dele-
gated to particular individuals. These circumstances can be described by characteristics 
of the business environment (technology, markets, regulation), employees’ human capi-
tal (what Schultz [1975] calls “the ability to deal with disequilibria”), and aspects of firm 
strategy. Elaborating these relationships is a main task of our future work. 
A related example: If we think of judgment as filling in the gaps of incomplete contracts, 
then the more complete the contract, the fewer circumstances in which “ultimate judg-
ment” must be exercised, and hence the more decision rights that can be delegated.  This 
implies an inverse relationship between contractual completeness and monitoring costs. 
While several TCE papers examine the determinants of completeness (Crocker and Mas-
ten, 1991; Crocker and Reynolds, 1993; Saussier, 2000), they generally focus on asset 
specificity, not monitoring costs, as the independent variable. 
Our approach also has implications for organizational learning. If entrepreneurship, and 
hence economic organization, is the act of arranging heterogeneous capital resources, 
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then it is important to understand how individuals and teams learn to do this success-
fully. Mayer and Argyres (2004) show that contracting parties don’t necessarily antici-
pate contractual hazards, and design arrangements to mitigate them, as TCE predicts; 
rather, contracting parties must often experience maladaptation to adjust to it. It is thus 
important to understand not only efficient contracting, but the process of learning to 
contract efficiently. In our framework, contracting ⎯ an exchange of legal rights and 
responsibilities governing the exchange of property titles ⎯ is part of the process of en-
trepreneurial experimentation. Just as asset attributes must be created or discovered 
over time, the efficient contractual arrangements governing asset uses must be created 
or discovered over time, through experimentation. Conceiving the problem this way 
calls for a theory of learning to organize heterogeneous capital. 
This hopefully suffices to illustrate that our approach is rich in novel implications.  Dis-
tilling and refining such implications, and in particular subjecting them to empirical 
testing will be the subject of future work.  
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